Introduction
The notary Andrea, a resident of Latera, in northeastern Tuscany, must have been exasperated on May 12, 1347, as he initiated a lawsuit against his neighbor Bartolomeo Pulci, scion of one of the elite Florentine lineages prescribed as magnates (EOG.81.26 v ). This was the third time since 1343 that Andrea appeared in the records The argument developed below is twofold. I argue that the case study demonstrates the practical relevance of the civic tribunals and their procedures to residents of Florentine Tuscany, despite a traditional view that public justice's ambit was constricted, its focus confined to repression, and its subjects disengaged from their judicial duties/rights during the later fourteenth century (e.g. Cohn, 1999: 138-9, 171; Manikowska, 1988: 538-9) . In dialogue with recent scholarship emphasizing institutions' responsiveness to social needs, it underlines the continuing centrality of a given civic tribunal at different sequences of the same fraught relationship (Roberts, 2018: 4-5) . The dispute between Andrea and the Pulci family moved in and out of the Executor's court, but also within the court's multiple venues. It suggests the need to revisit some assumptions regarding the function of public justice in relation to rural society. This underlines the importance of the political aspect of rural Italy's relationship with city-based states in the late Middle Ages (Cohn, 1999: 14-17) .
I would like to expand upon this through a close look at how a local disagreement filtered through multiple judicial procedures, and by looking at its local context. The dispute demonstrates the role of Florentine justice as a tactical resource in rural disputes. The case study was chosen because surviving documentation, although limited, enables analysis of how trial sequences fit in users' social life. 1 The Executor's court operated through inquisitorial and accusatorial procedures, with important modifications (see also, on Bolognese analogues, Blanshei, 2018: 55-82 ). Operators such as Andrea and Bartolomeo were aware of these options, making the tribunal's surviving documentation an invaluable source for the social history of rural Tuscany and the Florentine state, although modern historians have primarily used this material for information on the magnates (Klapisch-Zuber, 2006; Lansing, 2010; Caduff, 1993) .
Much of the scholarship on rural Tuscany's relationship with urban centers has focused on the economic, particularly fiscal and demographic, aspects of this 1 I echo here Vallerani (2018: 36) : 'Only by broadening…the documentary spectrum will we succeed in reconstructing the logic of the trial'.
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relationship, and its parasitic nature (Brown, 1982; Caferro, 1994; Conti, 2014; Fiumi, 1993) . Scholars have recently moved beyond this paradigm, emphasizing instead sub-regional differentiation (Cohn, 1999: 16-21; Hewlett, 2008: 1-15) . This article modifies our view of local communities' handling of urban communes by looking at the institutions of the Florentine state as a social relation, rather than instruments of repression or as externally-imposed administrative entities grafted onto communities (Cohn, 1999; Hewlett, 2008) . Rather, public institutions served as the norm-based terrain upon which individuals, social classes, and small groups operated. The outcomes of conflicts recorded in judicial records resulted from the intersecting (in)actions and goals of court personnel, disputants, and extended networks. This is one episode in the tale of how communities past perceived and grappled with institutions intended to project the illusion of a power separate from the society around it, rather than arising from the clash between and within different social strata and their aims (Jessop, 2009: 128) .
2
The article combines procedural and statutory material with notarial records to trace the parties in and out of court. Procedure, rather than an arcane apparatus autonomous from society, developed in tandem with it (Vallerani, 2018: 27-99 ).
This article investigates how the procedural mechanisms of the Executor's court translated the conflict into a series of claims, the discrepancies between Andrea's self-presentation, and what is reconstructable of his social standing. Limited in scope, the example of Latera indicates the value of further work in this direction. Case studies of conflicts' movement between communities and institutions reveal how individuals and networks tried to utilize public institutions' procedural apparatus.
The article proceeds in three sections. Section two introduces the dispute's institutional and social settings. It outlines the establishment and functioning of the Executor's court and introduces the Latera area. I review the community's socioeconomic profile and how local power networks operated, emphasizing the Yet no individual, group, or class subject can be said to have chosen or decided the final outcome of conflicting micro-power plays. Thus political class domination is both intentional and non-subjective'. 
The Tribunal and the Village: Frameworks for Conflict
This section outlines the institutional parameters within which the dispute played out and its local social context. Surviving records of the Executor of the Ordinances of Justice, preserved in Florence's State Archives, are the basis for explicating the dispute (see Statuti.3, , for the Executor's foundational legislation).
The Executor, established in June 1306, was unique to Florence and rooted in the struggle between the popolo and the magnates (Gualtieri, 2009: 236) . The magnates were composed of the city's old military elite (Diacciati, 2011: 19-28) . The popolo was the political coalition of elite financiers and merchants (popolo grasso) and their allies among the city's guild-organized merchants and artisans, and governed the city four times between 1250 and 1378 (Diacciati, 2011; Screpanti, 2008) .
Originating in a reform of the city's popular militias, the office was staffed by nonTuscans and closed to legal experts (iudex legista) and members of the civic militia (milites) (Gualtieri, 2009: 238) . The Executor was charged with applying Florence's anti-magnate Ordinances of Justice (1293-5) and syndicating communal officials (Gualtieri, 2009: 237-43 Anonymous written denunciations produced most of the tribunal's criminal investigations. If they provided the requisite information, an ex officio inquest followed. Tamburagioni were required to specify the crime, its date and location, the victim, the offending party, and any witnesses (Caduff, 1993: 26) . Any non-magnate There was no single model of inquisitorial procedure. Recent work has emphasized the continuities between inquisitorial modes of action and accusationbased procedure (Vallerani, 2018; Carraway Vitiello, 2016: 88-133) . Professional jurists such as Alberto Gandino encountered resistance from civic authorities when they did try to impose inquisitorial procedure modelled on anti-heretical inquests upon communal tribunals (Vallerani, 2018: 40-41 ). Florence's denunciation system exemplifies this heterogeneity. The Florentines may have borrowed the idea of anonymous denunciations from Bologna: the latter used them in magnate status trials from the 1290s (Blanshei, 2010: 215-18) . Denunciations triggered ex officio inquests, in which witness testimony provided the main evidence, as at Bologna (Blanshei, 2010: 184) . Written denunciations were intended to reduce the danger inherent in making in-person accusations against magnates.
Significant differences in demography, exchange networks, and culture characterized Florence's subject territories in the later Middle Ages (Cohn, 1999; Hewlett, 2008; Zorzi, 2008: 209-56) . The highlands north of Florence, containing the main passes between Tuscany and the Romagna, were a crucial borderland during the later Middle Ages (Pirillo, 2006; Dameron, 2003) . Here, recalcitrant rural lords and a prosperous upland peasantry resisted Florentine territorial encroachment well into the fifteenth century (Cherubini, 1968; Cohn, 1999) . The uplands' relationship with Florence has usually been studied in terms of military vicissitudes and the impact of fiscal policies on local demography and fiscality (Brown, 1982; Cherubini, 1967; Cherubini, 1972; Fiumi, 1993; Cohn, 1999; Hewlett, 2008) . When scholars have looked at the Tuscan mountains through the lens of the commune's judicial records, they have characterized Florentine activity here primarily in terms of violence (Cohn, 1999: 138-71; Hewlett, 2008: 43-74) . Fama, rumor/reputation, was a central concept in the Italian city-states' legal and social life, along with its cognates, common knowledge/public opinion (publica fama) and an individual's public repute (bona/mala fama). Its polyvalent nature also makes it a fruitful theme for scholars of medieval law and society (Carraway Vitiello, 2016: 88-133; Esposito, 2011; Kuehn, 2005; Migliorino, 1985; Müller, 2005; Stern, 2000; Telechea, 2007; Théry, 2003; Wickham, 2005) . Public actions constructed and conditioned the fama of people and events (Lansing, 2003) . Publica fama took three forms in Florentine criminal proceedings. A crime's fama triggered an ex officio inquest when it reached the courts' attention, usually in the form of an anonymous denunciation. The fama of individual persons appears most often in regard to the infamy of brigands and thieves (on such publici latrones, see Caduff, 1988 Compare this with the opening of the Ordinances of Justice (Zorzi & Diacciati, 2013: 74) : 'Quoniam iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum unicuique tribuens ideo infrascripta, que merito iustitie ordinamenta appellantur, pro rei publice utilitate edita sunt'.
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Without explaining the reversal, the court was using Andrea's fraudulent text as proof in uncovering the truth. Attention shifted from this mistake to the gravity of Andrea's crime and its inevitable punishment. Here, Gandino's stress on the link between truth and guilt emerges (Vallerani, 2012: 48) . The ex officio inquisition revealed this truth, which lay in the individual. Andrea had suborned himself before God, even while deceiving the court initially (Kuehn, 2006 (Kuehn, : 1059 ). Andrea's sin and crime, unjustly transferred to Bartolomeo, now was returned to its rightful bearer.
Andrea's denunciation claimed that in November 1343, Bartolomeo and his followers attacked Andrea and his brothers, Piero and Guido, in S. Niccolò's piazza (EOG.1.52v). The scene is typical of magnate denunciations of the 1340s, portraying countryfolk as innocent victims of magnate oppression (Caduff, 1993: 30-40; Klapisch-Zuber, 2006: 40-46) . No reason is given for the attack. It caused a great disturbance in Latera, as locals raised the hue and cry with parish church bells (EOG.1.52v; see also Manikowska, 1988: 537-8; Settia, 1997: 82-3; Müller, 2005: 30-8). The report did not include Andrea's brothers among the witnesses, nor do they appear in the tribunal's proceedings.
Andrea may have lodged the 1343 denunciation to take advantage of the atmosphere of hostility toward magnates following the July expulsion of the Duke of Athens and the subsequent magnates' Priorate. The Executor's court had been suspended during the Duke's lordship (1342-3), but was reinstated after his expulsion. According to the inquisition against Andrea, he had ordered his servant Brandaglia to deliver the denunciation to Florence, paying her two soldi in exchange, equivalent to one-tenth of a gold florin (EOG.1.52r; Dameron, 1991 A tangled web linked Andrea, his assailants, and venerable local families. These ties, almost invisible in processual records, are reconstructable from notarial material.
Andrea's extended familial network failed to materialize at all throughout the dispute, as did his professional associates. Viewed in relation to the dispute, this network highlights Andrea's position in the western Mugello's sub-regional elite, and his apparent inability to translate dense local interconnectivity into effective judicial action.
The relative prosperity of Andrea's family can be inferred from its marriages. Andrea's father and grandfather were notaries. His father Guido had done well enough to marry Compiuta, a woman from a rural branch of the Magalotti (NA.195.141 r ). This was an old, illustrious family, which entered Florence's priorate, the highest governing body of the commune, in 1283, a year after its establishment (Repetti, 1849: 657; Gualtieri, 2009: 173-204 
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Andrea's precise relationship with Magnotto de'Magalotti is unclear, but the description links him to the magnate Guineldi-Da Latera's lineage (EOG.1.52r; Klapisch-Zuber, 2006: 25) . 12 The sons of 'Guineldo da Barberino, e da Latera' appear in the 1325 list of rural magnates (Statuto del podestà: II.292). 13 The Magalotti sold some holdings in Latera to Bartolomeo's father, Pulce Pulci, in the mid-1340s (EOG.81, 32r; NA.195, 110v; 113r; 141r; 170v ). Andrea's network was at the heart of the Latera-Barberino area's elite. That he sought to use his knowledge to pursue a dispute over land and status is unsurprising: much of the civic tribunals' activity concerned disputes over these resources (see also Blanshei, 2010: 135-66; Wickham, 2004: 68-107 ). The suit proceeded without reference to Andrea's previous conviction or any evident sense of personal rancor between the parties. The record is free of the vocabulary of anger and animosity identified as shaping lawsuits elsewhere (Smail, 2001: 90-126; Smail, 2003: 89-132 
Conclusion
This article has reconstructed the conflicts of a social network as they moved between Florentine tribunals and Latera on the eve of the Black Death. It has emphasized the entwinement between a rural community and the city through judicial activity and economic exchanges, and the ability of countryfolk, properly placed, to try instrumentalizing judicial procedure. These efforts' outcome hinged on social relationships: the absence of Andrea's otherwise well-documented network from the dispute suggests that he was unable to convince others of his claims.
This did not stop him from pursuing his quarrel via several procedural avenues, all within the same civic magistracy. That he was able to sue despite a previous condemnation points to the ambiguous place of publica fama in this dispute. Its legal weight was not automatic, even within the same magistracy's tribunals (Stern, 2000; Carraway Vitiello, 2016; Wickham, 2005 The Executor's courts were only one theater for this conflict. Latera was the initial venue for the dispute, and its established hierarchies and relationships informed the parties' in-court behavior. The silence of Andrea's kinsmen throughout the dispute is deafening. They were active legally in the 1340s, just not in his dispute with the Pulci (e.g. NA.195.141r, 1413r, 144r) . There is also the problem of missing documentation. What does this case suggest about the relationship between public justice and rural society and its problems in the later Middle Ages? Unlike Florence's fiscal system, public justice allowed Tuscans some room for maneuver (Cohn, 1999) . Its procedures offered resources to those pursuing a grudge, provided they possessed the socioeconomic resources and network support that successful engagement with the courts required. In such a situation, evasion or resistance to state power was less appealing than engaging with it sensibly. Public justice made it possible to help one's friends and hurt one's enemies.
The case study also highlights some of the paradoxes of an explicitly ideological, partisan institution such as the Executor's court. Established by socially mobile urban merchants and professionals comparable to Andrea, it can be seen acting here to in effect protect the magnate Bartolomeo from a wronged member of the popolo, only to then allow this same popolano to pursue his grievances through a different procedural route.
Growing state intrusiveness into increasingly coherent and articulate communities was a central feature of later medieval Europe's history (Wickham, 2017: 255-57; Lantschner, 2015) . Along with warfare and revenue-gathering, public justice was a core manifestation of this intrusiveness. In addition, the Italian city-states' civic 
